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A HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE OF
REVISED ARTICLE 2: THE NEVER




HE road to revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) continues to be long and arduous. In 1988, a study group
appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) of the UCC
started to consider whether Article 2 should be revised. That study group
issued both a preliminary and a final report in 1991 recommending revi-
sion.1 The PEB authorized the appointment of a drafting committee and
a reporter 2 in 1991, and from that time until May 1999, the Drafting Com-
mittee met several times a year.
The drafting committee is composed of members of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the
American Law Institute (ALI), partners in the revision of the UCC.
Drafting committee meetings were open to the public. At the Article 2
meetings, advisors from the American Bar Association3 (ABA) and vari-
ous observers representing consumer interests and affected industries
were present and able to speak freely about revisions proposed or make
their own proposals for revisions in the drafts. 4 Unlike a legislative com-
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; J.D. 1983 University of Iowa
College of Law. From December 1996 until my resignation on July 26, 1999, I served as the
Associate Reporter to the Article 2 Drafting Committee. Prior to that time, I attended
Article 2 Drafting Committee meetings as an observer and worked with the ABA Subcom-
mittee on Sales providing comments on drafts and suggestions. This article reflects my
own views and not the views of the ALI, NCCUSL, the ABA, the drafting committee, or
the reporter, Professor Richard E. Speidel. My thanks to D. Benjamin Beard, William H.
Henning, Christina L. Kunz, and Roy Ryden Anderson for their helpful comments.
1. See Task Force, A.B.A. Comm. on the Unif. Commercial Code, An Appraisal of
the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study
Group, 16 DEL J. CORP. L. 981 (1991); Study Group, Permanent Editorial Bd. of the Unif.
Commercial Code, PEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive
Summary, 46 Bus. LAW. 1869 (1991).
2. Professor Richard E. Speidel served as the chair for the PEB Study group and was
reporter for the drafting committee from its inception until July 26, 1999, when he
resigned.
3. The ABA eventually appointed three advisors to the project.
4. The recent drafts of Revised Article 2 are on the website maintained by the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania at http://www.law.upenn.eduflibrary/ulclulc.htm.
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mittee where testimony is taken in a formal process, the drafting commit-
tee meetings consisted of a free-flow discussion of issues raised. Drafting
committee meetings throughout the process have been well attended.5 In
addition, people who were interested in the revision wrote letters expres-
sing viewpoints and making suggestions for the draft. Along the way, the
observers and advisors have made many comments that have improved
the quality of Revised Article 2. The receptiveness of the drafting com-
mittee to suggestions by people not on the drafting committee was re-
markable. Over the course of the process, the committee made many
changes to the drafts in specific response to suggestions from the observ-
ers and advisors.
Throughout the years, the drafts were also presented to ALI consulta-
tive groups, the ALI council, the ALI membership, and the NCCUSL
membership. In December 1998, the ALI council recommended that the
draft be submitted to its membership for approval and appointed an ad
hoc committee to monitor developments. The Revised Article 2 received
final approval from the ALI membership in May 1999 and was submitted
to NCCUSL at its annual meeting in July 1999 for final approval. 6 At
that meeting, after two sessions of reading revised Article 2, the NC-
CUSL president, Gene LeBrun, announced that no further reading of
revised Article 2 and Article 2A to the Committee of the Whole would
occur and that those acts would be read the following year due to a very
full agenda. This announcement came as a surprise to the Committee of
the Whole, which had read approximately half of the draft at that point.
The drafting committee was not informed of the decision to defer the
remainder of the reading prior to the announcement to the Conference.
In discussions between the Conference leadership and the members of
the drafting committee after the announcement, the committee was in-
formed that the deferment occurred, in large part, because of fear of con-
tinued industry opposition to the draft and the perceived threat of
nonuniform enactment of the revised article.
In spite of the give and take of the drafting process and constant at-
tempts to achieve a balanced consensus, some observers were not satis-
fied with what was in the Revised Article 2 July 1999 draft. Certain
segments of the observers felt that Revised Article 2 was not an improve-
ment over the current statute and should not be enacted. Others main-
tain that it improved the current statute by resolving litigated issues or
adapting sales law to current times. Resistance to revision of the statute
is perhaps best exemplified by what happened at the NCCUSL annual
meeting in 1997 and again in 1999. In 1997, certain revisions in the draft,
5. Drafting committee meetings ran from Friday morning through Sunday noon.
Typically, the committee met three times a year. Attendance ranged from approximately
40 people to over 100 people at each drafting committee meeting.
6. For a general description of the process for revising articles of the UCC, see Fred
H. Miller, Realism not Idealism in Uniform Laws - Observations from the Revision of the
UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 707, 712-16 (1998).
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particularly those aimed at consumer protection principles, 7 drew tre-
mendous fire as being unwarranted, creating such heat that the project
was put on hold to provide a cooling-off period. The drafting committee
did not meet again until March 1998, when it proceeded to deal directly
with those issues that raised such vehement concern. During 1998 and
1999, industry and consumer representatives continued to attend meet-
ings, and the drafting committee began to crystallize its approaches to
various difficult issues. By far the bulk of time in the last year was spent
on issues in the warranty area and the issue of consumer protection, par-
ticularly in standard-form contracting. The consumer protection provi-
sions in the July 1999 draft continued to be attacked by industry
representatives, again resulting in the Conference leadership's decision to
defer final approval at the NCCUSL annual meeting, despite representa-
tions to the ALI membership that further delay would not help. To quote
Fred Miller, Executive Director of NCCUSL at the 1999 ALI Annual
Meeting:
I would make two observations. One, I have been a commissioner
for over 25 years. I have taught commercial law for that same period
of time. If you take an objective look at the Revised Article 2 you
will find there are many benefits in there that will reduce litigation
costs, prevent litigation, answer questions. It is a quality product
from the standpoint of substance. It is also true that I think we have
reached the best balance we can. If you are going to delay this for a
year, yes, you can upset the balance one way or the other and that's
going to have an impact on enactment. I think it's time to let it go.
If you want to kill it, kill it, I agree with Mr. Langrock, but do not
delay it, it isn't going to get better.8
Gene LeBrun, President of NCCUSL also stated at the 1999 ALI An-
nual Meeting:
As I pointed out earlier, this project has been around between
NCCUSL and the ALI for 12 years, the Study Committee and then,
four years of Study Committee, eight years in the drafting process.
It's had innumerable Drafting Committee sessions, it's been before
the ALI Council, it's been before this membership before, it has
been before the body of NCCUSL, we have had four Drafting Com-
mittee meetings in the last year. All of the issues which have been
7. For example, in the July 1997 draft, section 2-206 provided:
(a) In a consumer contract, if a consumer agrees to a record, any non-negoti-
ated term that a reasonable consumer in a transaction of this type would not
reasonably expect to be in the record is excluded from the contract, unless
the consumer had knowledge of the term before agreeing to the record.
(b) Before deciding whether to exclude a term under subsection (a), the
court, on motion of a party or its own motion, after affording the parties a
reasonable and expeditious opportunity to present evidence on whether the
term should be included or excluded from the contract, shall decide whether
the contract should be interpreted to exclude the term.
(c) This section shall not operate to exclude an otherwise enforceable term
disclaiming or modifying an implied warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-206 (Proposed Draft July 1997).
8. ALI Annual Meeting 1999, unedited transcript, pp. 904-05.
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discussed here have been discussed many, many times on the floor of
the conference and particularly with the Drafting Committee. I
don't think that further delay is going to change the matter. We have
to bite the bullet at some point in time.
It's been discussed about the need for a more ongoing process and
keeping the code up to date. The Permanent Editorial Board has
discussed that. We in NCCUSL have discussed that. I think that's
important. Whether you adopt this draft or some other draft, not all
50 states are going to enact it at the same time, so if you're going to
move forward you are going to have some nonuniformity for some
period of time, but I think, as Geoff Hazard put in the Foreword to
the Comment, he says "Further consideration of the controversial
issues by the Drafting Committee is unlikely to produce closer con-
cord as to what the text should say. Certainly the work has been
pursued thoroughly, conscientiously, and perhaps near exhaus-
tively." And I submit that is the case and I submit it's time to enact,
approve this act, it's got a ways to go, it's got to go through the con-
ference yet, but I think further delay will not do us any further
good.9
As of this writing, a new reconstituted drafting committee to revise
both Article 2 and 2A has been appointed, consisting of a few former
members of both the Articles 2 and 2A drafting committees. William
Henning has been appointed chair, and Henry Gabriel has been ap-
pointed the reporter.
A summary of the history of the Article 2 revision process would not
be complete without a discussion of the failed "hub and spoke" concept
and the coordination issue that resulted, as separate committees tackled
drafting law about contracting principles. When the Article 2 revision
project started, one of the hot issues was whether and how Article 2
should cover software in addition to transactions in goods. The discus-
sions resulted in the eventual development of a "hub and spoke" concept
whereby general contracting principles would be placed in a hub and pro-
visions particular to each type of transaction would be placed in a sepa-
rate spoke. The drafting committee contemplated a spoke for sales of
goods, a spoke for leases, and a spoke for software licenses with the possi-
bility of additional spokes being added later on. In 1995. the NCCUSL
leadership decided that the concept was unworkable and the effort was
abandoned. A separate drafting committee to address software transac-
tions was appointed. Thus, proposed Article 2B was born (later denomi-
nated Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act).10 In addition,
in 1997 another drafting committee (Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act) was appointed to address electronic transactions, a subject that both
9. ALI Annual Meeting 1999, unedited transcript pp. 892-93.
10. In 1999, NCCUSL and ALI decided that Article 2B should not be part of the
UCC. Therefore, Article 2B was reborn as the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act (UCITA). NCCUSL approved UCITA at the July 1999 Annual Meeting.
UCITA was the subject of a considerable lobbying effort from both supporters and oppo-
nents prior to its approval.
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the Article 2 and Article 2B committees were supposed to address." Fi-
nally, an Article 2A drafting committee was appointed to consider
whether any changes made in Article 2 would be appropriate for leasing
transactions. Thus, on many issues, three drafting committees, and on
electronic issues, four drafting committees, were considering the
problems and, of course, coming to different approaches. Needless to
say, over the course of the process, issues of harmony among the provi-
sions of the various drafts were always present. Instead of the "hub and
spoke" method, a more difficult coordination effort ensued whereby the
chairs and reporters for the different drafts endured coordination meet-
ings to discuss whether and how the drafts should be similar. This back
door "hub and spoke" resulted in competition between the committees
when disagreements arose about the related provisions in each draft.
This article will address the process of uniform law revision as it has
played out in the Article 2 process. I have a unique perspective in that
for the first several years I was on the side of the observers working with
the ABA Subcommittee on Sales and during the last three years, until my
recent resignation, I was on the side of the drafting committee serving as
the Associate Reporter. I have seen the effort from both sides in trying
to come up with a workable product. After a discussion of the uniform
law process, this article will address the provisions in the July 1999 draft
of Revised Article 2 that balance buyer's and seller's interests in contracts
for the sale of goods. Following that discussion, this article will address
the lessons learned in the revision process.
II. UNIFORM LAW REVISION: COMPLAINTS
AND COMPLIMENTS
Over the past decade, the UCC has been substantially revised.' 2 The
process of revision has spawned substantial literature evaluating that pro-
cess. 13 Inevitably the revision process has both critics and supporters.
11. That drafting committee produced the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,
which was approved by NCCUSL at its July 1999 Annual Meeting.
12. The following schedule of revised articles demonstrates the efforts of NCCUSL
and ALI over the last ten years: Revised Article 6 (Bulk Sales) (1989); new Article 4A
(Funds Transfer) (1989); Revised Articles 3 and 4 (Negotiable Instruments) (1990); Re-
vised Article 8 (Investment Securities) (1994); Revised Article 5 (Letters of Credit) (1995);
Revised Article 9 (Secured Transactions) (1998). Article 1 (General Provisions) is still in
the revision process and will be finished in 2000 or 2001. Article 7 (Warehouse Receipts,
Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title) is under study to determine the need for
revision. The future of Revised Articles 2 and 2A is still in flux as of this writing.
13. Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on "Purpose" in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 419 (1997) (critiquing the process of preparing commentary
to revised code); Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply to
Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217 (1996) (replying to a critique of a private
legislation process and concluding that it is no worse and may be better than a public
legislative process); Amelia H. Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner
and Scholar Alike, 39 ALA. L. REV. 575 (1988) (describing the Article 2A process and the
need for broader input early on in the process in order to get more perspectives on draft
shaping decisions); Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U.C.C. Articles Three and Four. A
Process Which Excluded Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L.
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REV. 827 (1992) (arguing that a federal payments code should be adopted to deal with
consumer concerns that were ignored in the revisions of Articles 3 and 4); Neil B. Cohen &
Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for the New Millennium: Will the Current
Process Suffice?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 551 (1993) (analyzing the pros and cons of uniform
laws process in comparison to hypothetical federal process); Corinne Cooper, The Madon-
nas Play Tug of War with the Whores or Who Is Saving the UCC?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 563
(1993) (discussing the roles of interest groups and reformers in the UCC process); Mari-
anne B. Culhane, The UCC Revision Process: Legislation You Should See in the Making, 26
CREIGHTON L. REV. 29 (1992) (noting the need for early involvement in order to build a
consensus and have uniform enactment); Richard A. Elbrecht, The NCCUSL Should
Abandon Its Search for Consensus and Address More Difficult and Controversial Issues
Applying "Process" Concepts, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 147 (1994) (arguing that a consensus
approach and focus on uniform enactability results in drafting laws used to resolve dis-
putes, rather than laws to be used in conducting business transactions, and eliminates the
ability to deal with controversial issues); Clayton P. Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Com-
ment on Scott, 80 VA. L. REV. 1853 (1994) (arguing that a revision, as opposed to reconcep-
tualization is more likely to result in capture by interest groups, as not enough is at stake to
energize real pluralism); Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will
Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998) (discuss-
ing the difficulty of getting uniform enactment and how that encourages capture of the
process and a race to the bottom); Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform
Laws-Observations From the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 707 (1998) (identi-
fying issues of politicalization, push for uniformity, consumer protection, and harmoniza-
tion of revisions); Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private
Law Area, 79 MINN. L. REV. 861 (1995) (responding to critiques of the process as too
concerned about enactability, the influence of interest groups, and participation in the pro-
cess); Fred H. Miller, The Uniform Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43
MERCER L. REV. 799 (1992) (discussing the need for broad participation in order to obtain
consensus); A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 645 (1996)
(evaluating policy, public choice, and contextual approaches to the revision process, and
arguing the process should seek to revise law within the constraints of political accountabil-
ity, inclusion of interest groups, and uniformity of laws and that the contextual model of
revision best fulfils those goals); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and
the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 83 (1993) (analyzing the revision process for Article 4 in light of concerns about
enactable legislation, role of interest groups, the balance of power between state and fed-
eral governments, and the effect on consumer interests); Donald J. Rapson, Who is Look-
ing Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light
(and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 249 (1994) (eval-
uating revision process in light of serving the public interest defined as fair rules, arguing
for executive sessions of drafting committees in order to discuss issues outside presence of
interest groups); Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC Process-Consensus and Balance, 28 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 287 (1994) (describing the participation and process of development of Arti-
cle 4A and arguing for an open and participatory process involving affected constituen-
cies); Albert J. Rosenthal, Moderator, Uniform State Laws: A Discussion Focused on
Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 OKLA. CIr U. L. REV. 257 (1997) (debat-
ing the pros and cons of the NCCUSL process of developing uniform state laws in light of
the alternatives); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3
and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991) (arguing that the process must have interest groups in
balance in order to come up with fair compromise solutions); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking
Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Arti-
cles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993) (noting that lawyers involved in the process
identify with their clients' interests, the absence of consumer interest participation early in
the process of revising Articles 3 and 4, the effect of the adversarial nature of lawyers on
the process, the resistance to new ways of thinking about subjects, the lack of empirical
evidence and the difficulty of effecting change at the legislative stage); Steven L. Schwarcz,
A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29
GA. L. REV. 909 (1995) (arguing that the revision process should take place within the
constraints of clarity, simplicity, flexibility, fairness, consistency and completeness); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PENN.
L. REV. 595 (1995) (applying a model that predicts the specificity of rules emerging from
REVISED ARTICLE 2
This section will discuss the complaints and compliments about the UCC
revision process in the context of the experience in the Article 2 drafting
process.
The most often repeated objections in the literature about the revision
process pose two concerns: (i) the influence of interest groups that may
capture the process in the absence of countervailing, equally powerful
interest groups; and (ii) non-uniform enactment or failure to enact a revi-
sion product.14 These two fears together lead to doubts about the policy
choices made in the drafts as not serving the public interest.15 This issue
of whether the drafts serve the public interest has frequently been at the
core of concerns about how the revision process deals with consumer is-
sues that tend to be controversial and difficult for drafting committees to
address.16 The difficulty in addressing controversial issues in light of in-
terest group influence and the quest for uniform enactability has in some
cases led to a politicization of positions with the accompanying threat to
stop enactment unless the drafting committee chooses the position taken
by the entity making the threat.1 7
While interest groups have been very active in the Article 2 revision
process, they did not capture the drafting committee. This failure of cap-
ture is perhaps best reflected in the letters that continued to pour in pro-
testing various items in the revision as the draft proceeded to final
approval at the ALI and NCCUSL in 1999. Whether the industry has
captured the leadership of NCCUSL remains to be seen in light of the
leadership's decision at the 1999 NCCUSL annual meeting to defer the
project for yet another year and to reconstitute the drafting committee,
which will presumably be more receptive to industry complaints. Con-
various types of participants in the reform process, including a preference for the status
quo and the risk of capture by interest groups); Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80
VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994) (analyzing the revision of Article 9 in light of interest group
influence on the project); Harry C. Sigman, Improving the UCC Revision Process: Two
Specific Proposals, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 325 (1994) (advocating a public comment period
for the final approved draft prior to enactment in states and a delayed common effective
date to improve participation in process); William D. Warren, UCC Drafting: Method and
Message, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 811 (1993) (detailing the difficult task of obtaining a con-
sensus and dealing with consumer issues); William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist and Se-
cured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1511 (1997) (noting that enactability concerns and interest group threat
to enactment limits policy choices). For a critique of NCCUSL's promulgation of uniform
law as an enterprise, see Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analy-
sis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996). See generally James J. Brudney,
Mediation and Some Lessons from the Uniform State Law Experience, 13 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 795 (1998) (giving an overview and suggestions on developing uniform medi-
ation law).
14. See Gillette, supra note 13, at 1867-69; Janger, supra note 13, at 578-80; Patchel,
supra note 13, at 123-25; Scott, Politics, supra note 13, at 1818-21; Woodward, supra note
13, at 1521-25.
15. See Cooper, supra note 13; Patchel, supra note 13; Rapson, supra note 13.
16. Elbrecht, supra note 13; Miller, Realism, supra note 6, at 726-30; Rubin, Effi-
ciency, supra note 13; Warren, supra note 13, at 821.
17. Miller, Realism, supra note 6, at 717-21.
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cerns about enactability18 had already influenced the July 1999 draft and
resulted in compromises in positions the drafting committee originally
maintained. For example, the drafting committee eventually backed
down from the decision to repeal the statute of frauds based on continued
industry support for a statute of frauds. It is fair to say that a majority of
the drafting committee decided that the fight over whether to have a stat-
ute of frauds was not worth continuing, even though modern practice in-
ternationally has done away with statutes of frauds, and maintaining a
statute of frauds in Article 2 keeps the domestic law of this country out of
step with the rest of the world.19 The drafting committee's ability to deal
with the controversial issues, such as standard-form contracting in con-
sumer contracts, was minimal due to interest group pressure, in spite of
effective representation of consumer interests.20 The standard-form con-
tracting issue generated the most comments from participants in the pro-
cess. The observers opposing the consumer provisions have repeatedly
threatened to stop enactment in the states if the draft contained the pro-
posed provisions for consumer contracts in standard-form situations.
The literature about the revision process discusses the significant toll
on human and fiscal capital that the process involves. The time and re-
source commitment to participation in the process makes it difficult to
bring all affected constituencies to the table to consider a product in a
timely manner and to achieve consensus. Even if consensus is achieved in
the drafting process, that consensus is often illusory when the product
reaches the states and other groups get involved.21 In addition, another
criticism directed at the process is that the natural tendency to resist
change to the status quo makes meaningful reform difficult, necessarily
resulting in a law that, in some participant's view, does not go far enough
in addressing various issues.22 The Article 2 process has been very long,
involving not only two dozen drafting committee meetings but many
more hours in producing and reading drafts and providing commentary
on the proposals over the course of seven years. The length of the pro-
cess resulted in a test of the staying power of various groups. In addition,
many groups who knew about the process chose not to get involved until
later in the process, given the time and expense of participation. Resist-
ance to changing current Article 2 was persistent. The July 1999 draft is
drafted in the same style as current Article 2, but with a conscious at-
18. According to NCCUSL's Constitution, the Conference's purpose is "to promote
unformity in the law among the several States on subjects as to which unformity is desira-
ble and practicable." NCCUSL CONST., art. 1, § 1.2. Obviously, with that mission, con-
cerns about enactablility are proper concerns for that body.
19. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, art. 11, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9 (1983), 19 I.L.M. 671,
reprinted in 15 U.S.C. app. 52 (1997).
20. The history of the fight over consumer standard form contract principles is de-
tailed in Michael M. Greenfield & Linda J. Rusch, Limits on Standard-Form Contracts in
Revised Article 2, 32 UCC L.J. 115 (1999).
21. See Sigman, supra note 13, at 327-30.
22. See Woodward, supra note 13, at 1522-23.
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tempt to fix language anomalies according to modern NCCUSL style
rules while retaining the same substance in a majority of its provisions.
The proponents of the status quo resisted any changes, even changes such
as gender neutral language, noun and verb agreement, parallel sentence
structure, and consistent use of defined terms as perhaps causing unin-
tended substantive change.
On the compliment side, there are several benefits from the uniform
laws process. First, uniform law in and of itself facilitates commercial ac-
tivity, providing relatively well-drafted statutes that allow interstate com-
merce to play by the same sets of rules across the country.2 3 While
federal legislation would result in uniformity, some express concern
about whether federal action would be able to accomplish that goal with
the same degree of quality as a NCCUSL product.24 Whether the July,
1999 draft of Article 2 would have been enacted in a uniform manner is
unknown, given the decision to defer further consideration of the draft.
A federal Article 2 would undoubtedly result in a different calculus of the
balance of the rights between sellers and buyer, particularly consumer
buyers.
Another benefit of the uniform law process is the ability to gather ex-
pertise that may result in more informed decision makers and ultimately
better law.25 In the Article 2 revision process, several academics served
as drafting committee members, but relatively few academics participated
as observers. Some academics served as paid experts for various lobbying
groups. The expertise of practitioners has been well represented. Given
the pervasiveness of Article 2 in law school curriculums, it is surprising
that relatively few academics participated in the process in any meaning-
ful way, through attendance at meetings or written comments on drafts.
Many of the participants in attendance at the meetings represented major
manufacturers of goods, and a few participants represented consumer
interests.
The openness of the process is also a significant benefit. NCCUSL has
worked hard to open up the process so that those who have the time and
the money to attend meetings may participate in the process. The drafts
are widely circulated and available electronically. This wider net facili-
tates bringing more people to the table with a variety of experiences that
informs the drafting committee regarding the merits and demerits of par-
ticular proposals for the drafts. The Article 2 drafting committee meet-
ings were open. The chair allowed everyone present to voice views,
sometimes resulting in meetings that bogged down, but all viewpoints had
an opportunity to speak. However, the ability to keep up with develop-
ments and the latest drafts was not as good as one would hope in this
electronic age. Drafts were produced at a rate that was faster than the
ability to produce commentary in a timely manner for the drafting com-
23. Miller, Future, supra note 13, at 861-62.
24. Miller, Future, supra note 13, at 863-64; Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 13.
25. See Miller, Future, supra note 13; Overby, supra note 13.
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mittee to consider, resulting in commentary received at a time when it
was no longer addressed to the latest draft.
Having participated in the process for the last five years from both
sides of the table, I have several personal observations about the process
that are not reflected in the literature summarized above. The process
itself is extraordinarily educational about the difficulty of writing policy-
based legislation in a democratic system of competing interests. Attempt-
ing to find middle ground positions which were acceptable to persons at
the drafting committee meetings was grueling. There are several reasons
why that consensus middle ground was so difficult to find. First, the
wrong people are at the table. The business people and consumers, not
their lawyers, should provide the baseline for commercial mores and dis-
cussions about reasonable standards of behavior. As we all know, a law-
yer's job is to keep a client's risks to a minimum. Thus, even if a business
person might agree that a particular rule is reasonable and reflects a good
accommodation of risk, a lawyer negotiating on behalf of the client may
attempt to reduce that risk even further. This risk-avoidance orientation
of the lawyers involved in the process was reflected in positions taken
during the drafting proeess that supported changes that reduced current
risk to sellers but opposed changes that may have increased current risk
to sellers. In addition, advocates who might agree that a provision was a
solid compromise provision were unable to bind their clients to that com-
promise. Thus, the various debates were repeated over and over again as
the drafting committee attempted to figure out what position would re-
sult in a "deal" on a particular provision. The process of seeking compro-
mise and consensus was also hampered by the presence of lobbyists who
had little knowledge of commercial principles or the current state of the
law but who knew the position that their constituents wanted in the law,
making policy choices based on compromise to a middle position difficult.
Another difficulty encountered in the Article 2 process was that the
goal of uniform enactability undermined the goal of policy legislation
based upon a consensus. The ability to threaten to block enactment from
various parties influenced the drafting committee to attempt to reach
compromise on various issues. However, the more compromise was
sought on the major issues, the less likely it was to be achieved, as various
groups threatened to stop passage of the revision if they did not get their
way. The incentive for opposing groups to compromise and arrive at con-
sensus policy statements is gone as long as the sponsoring organization
yields to threats from groups who insist that the statute be written their
way or they will stop enactment in the states. This lesson, unfortunately,
has come through loud and clear as demonstrated by the latest decision
to defer final reading of Revised Article 2.
Finally, devising a different process for drafting commercial law in a
democratic society would be extremely difficult.26 The emphasis on dem-




ocratic process is vital to understanding the dynamics of the revision pro-
cess. Rules produced in a democracy reflect the interests of those who
write and enact them. The rules will not be theoretically pure and will
reflect tradeoffs between various positions. As long as NCCUSL is com-
mitted to a type of democratic participatory process and is afraid of non-
uniform enactment of an article of the UCC, what has happened in the
UCC revision is inevitable. Moving the revisions to another forum, such
as federal enactment, would not necessarily change the dynamics of the
process or result in less influence by interest groups so as to lead to a
better law.
An undemocratic and less participatory process has drawbacks as well.
While the possibility exists that the law might be "better" from some
viewpoints, it is equally possible that it could be "worse" from other view-
points. A less participatory process involves a risk that the proposed stat-
ute could not be enacted in any states as constituents excluded from the
process attack the proposed statute. While it is necessary for the process
to be a participatory process in order to have a law that has the best
chance of providing the best possible rule given the participants, partici-
pation should not equal veto power over the project. Unfortunately, NC-
CUSL leadership's fear of non-uniform enactment of an article of the
UCC gives recalcitrant participants little incentive to seek a middle
ground that accommodates all participants and leads to strong interest
groups having virtual veto power over UCC projects.
III. PRODUCING A BALANCED REVISION
Current Article 2 contains provisions that favor both the buyer and the
seller. The July 1999 draft of Revised Article 2 continues that balanced
approach while making changes to deal with modem business practices,
including international practice, and addressing various issues that have
been litigated over the four decades the current code has been in place.
Maintaining that balance has been difficult in the face of pressure from
both industry representatives and consumer representatives about vari-
ous proposals for changing the statute. The following discussion is based
upon the July 1999 draft.
Revised Article 2 continues the freedom of contract philosophy of cur-
rent Article 2. Parties should be free to agree to terms and vary the de-
fault rules of Article 2 subject to the usual limitations of contract law such
as fraud, duress and unconscionability.27 Revised Article 2 also continues
the reliance on business practices to help define the parties' agreements
through its use of course of dealing, course of performance and usage of
27. Revised Section 2-108 provides:
(a) Unless a section in this article otherwise provides, the effect of any provi-
sion of this article may be varied by agreement.
(b) The presence of mandatory language, such as "must" or "shall," or the
absence of enabling language, such as "unless otherwise agreed," does not by
itself preclude the parties from varying by agreement a provision of this
article.
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trade.28 Beyond that general orientation, however, the revision addresses
several key issues in a manner designed to achieve a balance in Article 2
between buyers and sellers and between fairness and certainty in contract
law. This article will briefly explore the issues of balance in the following
areas: standard-form contracts, warranties, breach, and remedies.
The basic contract formation principle in both current and Revised Ar-
ticle 2 is that the parties may contract in any manner sufficient to show
agreement.2 9 With one notable exception, once a contract is formed, the
(c) Whenever this article allocates a risk or imposes a burden between the
parties, they may agree to shift the allocation and to apportion the risk or
burden.
(d) Whether a term is conspicuous or unconscionable under Section 2-105 is
a question to be determined by the court.
U.C.C. § 2-108 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
28. For example, revised Section 2-202, as amended at the NCCUSL annual meeting
in 1999 provides:
(a) Terms on which the confirmatory records of the parties agree, or which
are otherwise set forth in a record intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to the included terms, may not be con-
tradicted by evidence of any previous agreement or a contemporaneous oral
agreement. However, terms in the record may be supplemented by evidence
of:
(1) consistent additional terms, unless the court finds that the record was
intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agree-
ment; and
(2) course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.
(b) Terms in a record may be explained by evidence of course of perform-
ance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without a preliminary determina-
tion by the court that the language used is ambiguous.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
29. Current Section 2-204 provides:
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found
even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-204 (1995).
Revised Section 2-203 provides:
(a) A contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including offer and acceptance, conduct of both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract, or the interaction of electronic agents.
(b) If the parties so intend, an agreement sufficient to constitute a contract
may be found even if the time of its making is undetermined, one or more
terms are left open or to be agreed upon, the records of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract, or one party reserves the right to modify
terms.
(c) Even if one or more terms are left open or to be agreed upon, a contract
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
(d) Language that expressly conditions the intention to make a contract
upon agreement by the other party to terms proposed prevents contract for-
mation unless the other party agrees or conduct by both parties recognizes
the existence of a contract. However, an express condition contained as a
standard term in a record must be conspicuous.
U.C.C. § 2-203 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
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determination of the terms of that contract are left to general contract
principles outside of Article 2, supplanted by the provisions of Article 2
on gap-fillers and warranties.30 That notable exception is found in Sec-
tion 2-207 dealing with the so-called "battle of the forms."'31
Although not denominated as such, the thrust of current Section 2-207
was directed at the exchange of preprinted forms, a type of standard-form
contracting. The commentary criticizing current Section 2-207 is legion.32
At stake in the "battle of the forms" scenario is the question of what to
do with terms in forms that no one reads or expects to read and that the
business people do not expect to govern the terms of the transaction.33
When something goes wrong so that a party is looking to the terms in the
forms to determine rights and responsibilities, should a court give effect
to terms in either the buyer's or seller's form? If so, various subsidiary
questions come into play. Should it matter in what order the forms are
sent? Should it matter whether one form is silent on a particular issue?
Should it matter whether a form contains language purporting to prevent
contract formation, except upon the other party's acceptance of the form
terms? Should it matter that one side is sophisticated enough to know
how to play the game in order to get their terms and the other side is not
as sophisticated? The above questions are relevant, not only to the two
or more form transaction, but to the one form transaction as well.
Attempting to confront the reality of standard-form transactions in the
revision of Article 2 has been somewhat difficult in the battle of the forms
scenario and exceedingly difficult in the typical one-form transaction, the
30. See the parol evidence rule (Section 2-202) and the provisions in parts 3 and 4 of
the July 1999 draft.
31. Current Section 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confir-
mation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of this Act.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995).
32. Linda J. Rusch, The Relevance of Evolving Domestic and International Law on
Contracts in the Classroom: Assumptions About Assent, 72 TUL. L. REv. 2043, 2047-2050
(1998) (Sources cited in footnote 9).
33. "Business persons do not consider the boilerplate printed on the reverse side of
their forms to be part of the deal unless it coincidentally reflects some aspect of custom,
usage, course of dealing, or practice that they understand as implicit in the resulting trans-
actional relationship." Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The Commercial Irrelevancy
of the "Battle of the Forms," 49 Bus. LAw. 1019, 1026 (1994).
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consumer contract. In Revised Article 2, the "battle of the forms" scena-
rio has used as its baseline approach a modified knockout rule that is
based upon current section 2-207(3). This modified knockout rule pro-
vides that the terms of the contract include the standard terms in the
forms, non-standard terms that the parties have agreed to, standard terms
to which the other party expressly agreed, and the code provisions. This
rule applies in two situations: (1) when the parties form a contract based,
not upon the exchange of forms, but upon conduct that demonstrates
agreement; and (2) when the acceptance is in a record that contains terms
that vary from the terms in the offer.34 In the one-form transaction, the
revision provides a modest control on obnoxious terms in consumer con-
tracts through the unconscionability mechanism. 35 This unconscionability
34. Revised Section 2-207 provides:
(a) This section is subject to Section 2-105.
(b) If a contract is formed by offer and acceptance and the acceptance is by a
record containing terms additional to or different from the offer, or if the
conduct of the parties recognizes the existence of a contract but the records
of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract, the terms of the contract
include:
(1) terms in the records of the parties to the extent that they agree;
(2) nonstandard terms, whether or not in a record, to which the parties have
otherwise agreed;
(3) standard terms in a record supplied by a party to which the other party
has expressly agreed; and
(4) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of [the Uniform
Commercial Code].
(c) If a party confirms a contract by a record received by the other party
which contains terms that add to or differ from those in the confirmed con-
tract, the terms of the contract include:
(1) terms in the confirmation and the confirmed contract, to the extent that
they agree;
(2) terms in the confirmed contract to which the parties have previously
agreed;
(3) standard terms in a confirming record that add to or differ from the con-
firmed contract to which the other party expressly agrees; and
(4) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this article.
(d) In this section, a party does not expressly agree to a term by the mere
retention or use of goods.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
35. Revised Section 2-105 provides:
(a) If a court as a matter of law finds a contract or any term thereof to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconsciona-
ble term, or so limit the application of an unconscionable term as to avoid an
unconscionable result.
(b) In a consumer contract, a nonnegotiated term in a standard form record
is unconscionable and is not enforceable if it:
(1) eliminates the essential purpose of the contract;
(2) subject to Section 2-202, conflicts with other material terms to which the
parties have expressly agreed; or
(3) imposes manifestly unreasonable risk or cost on the consumer in the
circumstances.
(c) If a court as a matter of law finds that a consumer contract or any term
thereof has been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable
conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a consumer
contract, the court may grant appropriate relief.
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provision received a key vote of support by the Committee of the Whole
at the 1999 NCCUSL annual meeting by a two to one margin. Both ap-
proaches are a modest attempt to balance fairness with certainty to facili-
tate a method of contracting that bears little resemblance to the paradigm
case of dickered terms between parties of equal bargaining power. Both
provisions apply equally to buyers and sellers and, on their face, favor
neither side.
Some writers contend, however, that the gap-filler provisions, which
take the place of terms determined to be unenforceable, favor the buyer,
particularly as to the implied warranty and consequential damages
terms.36 That favoritism is true if one starts with the normative assump-
tion that the baseline expectation in a sale of goods transaction should be
that the buyer receives no warranty regarding the goods and, in the event
of breach, a buyer should not recover consequential damages. The base-
line expectation in current and Revised Article 2 has been and continues
to be that a buyer has a right, absent a contrary bargain, to expect a cer-
tain level of quality in goods when the goods are sold by a merchant with
respect to goods of the kind (i.e., a merchantability warranty) and that if
the contract is breached, a buyer is entitled to recover its expectancy in-
terest, including foreseeable and provable consequential damages. The
fact that sellers may not want to have these risks does not make it unfair
that the baseline expectation of a seller's responsibility entails those risks.
Sales law long ago progressed beyond the harsh environs of caveat
emptor.37 The provisions in Revised Article 2 directed to standard-form
contracting should benefit both buyers and sellers as the provisions
should function to guide parties to reasonable terms in the forms and to
force the parties to get agreement to terms that alter the basic assump-
tions regarding the seller's and buyer's responsibilities in a sales
transaction.
A second area where a balance between buyers and sellers was at-
tempted was in the warranty provisions. The warranty provisions in cur-
rent Article 2 are not well adapted to the modern method of marketing
and distribution of goods. The revision recognizes this phenomenon and
provides a clear demarcation between warranties made to buyers in priv-
ity with the seller and warranties made to parties not in privity. Courts
have long recognized in many contexts that parties not in privity should
have an Article 2 warranty claim even though the statutory language of
(d) If it is claimed or appears to the court that a contract or any term thereof
may be unconscionable, the parties must be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-105 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
36. See Mark E. Roszkowski & John D. Wladis, Revised U.C.C. Section 2-207 Analysis
and Recommendations, 49 Bus. LAW. 1065, 1069-70 (1994).
37. See Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring an Historical Understanding of
Duties to Disclose, Fraud and Warranties, 104 CoM. L.J. 168 (1999).
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current Article 2 did not precisely allow for that possibility.38
Under the revision, warranties to parties in privity follow the familiar
code provisions of express warranty and the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.39 A new provision,
38. For a recent case, see Yates v. Pitman Manufacturing, Inc., 514 S.E.2d 605 (Va.
1999). See also, William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-
Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-
318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1215 (1993); William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of
Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted
Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternatives B and C), 27 AKRON L. REv. 197
(1993).
39. Revised Section 2-403 provides:
(a) Any representation made by the seller to the immediate buyer, including
a representation made in any medium of communication to the public, such
as advertising, which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods will conform to the
representation or, with respect to a sample or model, that the whole of the
goods will conform to the sample or model.
(b) To create an express warranty, it is not necessary that the seller use for-
mal words such as "warranty" or "guaranty" or have a specific intention to
make a warranty. However, a representation merely of the value of the
goods or an affirmation purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods does not create an express warranty under subsec-
tion (a).
(c) A representation under subsection (a) becomes part of the basis of the
bargain unless:
(1) the immediate buyer knew that the representation was not true;
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the immediate buyer would not
believe that the representation was part of the agreement; or
(3) in the case of a representation made in any medium of communication to
the public, including advertising, the immediate buyer did not know of the
representation at the time of the sale.
(d) A right of action for breach of warranty under this section accrues as
provided in Section 2-814(c).
U.C.C. § 2-403 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-404 provides:
(a) Subject to Sections 2-406 and 2-407, a warranty that goods are merchant-
able is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section, the serving for value of
food or drink to be consumed on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(b) Goods, to be merchantable, at a minimum must:
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
(2) in the case of fungible goods, be of fair, average quality within the
description;
(3) be fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that description are
used;
(4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
(5) be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement or cir-
cumstances may require; and
(6) conform to any representations made on the container or label.
(c) Subject to Section 2-406, other implied warranties may arise from course
of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-404 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-405 (July 1999 draft) provides:
Subject to Section 2-406, if a seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods are fit for that purpose.
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Section 2-408, allows for warranties by seller to a remote buyer, a buyer
not in privity with the seller, based upon package inserts and upon adver-
tising.40 Recognition of remote warranty obligation is an acknowledg-
40. U.C.C. § 2-405 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-408 provides:
(a) In this section:
(1) "Goods" means new goods and goods sold or leased as new goods in the
sale to the remote buyer or in the lease to the remote lessee;(2) "Remote lessee" means a lessee that leased good from an immediate
buyer or a person in the ordinary chain of distribution.(b) If a seller makes a representation or a remedial promise in a record
packaged with or accompanying the goods and the seller reasonably expects
the record to be, and the record is, furnished to the remote buyer or a remote
lessee, the following rules apply:
(1) The seller has an obligation to the remote buyer or remote lessee that
the goods will conform to the representation or that it will perform any re-
medial promise unless:(A) a reasonable person in the position of the remote buyer'or remote lessee
would not believe that the representation created an obligation; or
(B) the representation is merely of the value of the goods or is an affirma-
tion purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods.
(2) The seller's obligation to the remote buyer or remote lessee created
under paragraph (1) also extends to:
(A) any member of the family or household unit or any invitee of the re-
mote consumer buyer or remote consumer lessee; and(B) a transferee from the remote consumer buyer or remote consumer
lessee and any subsequent transferee, but, for purposes of this paragraph, the
seller may limit its obligation to the remote consumer buyer or remote con-
sumer lessee or may limit extension to a particular person or transferee or a
class of transferees, if the limitation is furnished to the remote consumer
buyer or remote consumer lessee at the time of the sale or with the record
that makes the representation, whichever is later.(c) If a seller makes a representation in a medium for communication to the
public, such as advertising, the seller has an obligation to the remote buyer or
remote lessee that the goods will conform to the representation and that the
seller will perform any accompanying remedial promise if:
(1) the remote buyer purchased or the remote lessee leased the goods from a
person in the normal chain of distribution with knowledge of the representa-
tion and with the expectation that the goods will conform to the
representation;(2) a reasonable person in the position of the remote buyer or the remote
lessee with knowledge of the representation would expect the goods to con-
form to the representation; and
(3) the representation is not merely of the value of the goods or is not an
affirmation purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods.
(d) An obligation may be created under this section even if the seller does
not use formal words, such as "warranty" or "guaranty".(e) An express warranty obligation under this section is breached if the
goods did not conform to the representation creating the express warranty
obligation when the goods left the seller's control. A right of action for
breach of an express warranty obligation under this section accrues as pro-
vided in Section 2-814.
(f) The following rules apply to the remedies for breach of an obligation
created under this section and, unless otherwise stated, an obligation ex-
tended under Section 2-409, or for breach of any remedial promise that is
part the obligation:
(1) A seller under this section may modify or limit the remedies available to
persons to which an obligation is created, if the modification or limitation is
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ment of the modern marketing and distribution system in which the
manufacturers give warranties to persons not in privity. 41 The recogni-
tion of these remote warranties also comes with a recognition of the re-
mote seller's ability to limit remedies42 and to curtail the extension of the
warranty to nonbuyers, 43 as well as providing a clear accrual rule for
bringing actions based upon the remote warranty.44
furnished to the remote buyer or remote lessee no later than the time of sale
or lease or with the record that makes the representation.
(2) Damages may be proved in any manner that is reasonable. Unless spe-
cial circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount, the mea-
sure of damages if the goods do not conform to a representation is the value
of the goods as represented less the value of the goods as delivered, and the
measure of damages for breach of a remedial promise is the value of the
promised remedial performance less the value of any remedial performance
completed.
(3) Subject to any enforceable modification or limitation of remedy, a seller
in breach under this section is liable for incidental or consequential damages
under Sections 2-805 and 2-806 but is not liable for lost profits.
U.C.C. § 2-408 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
41. See Donald F. Clifford, Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One
Purchase, Two Relationships, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 413 (1997); Curtis R. Reitz, Manufacturers'
Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (1997).
42. See U.C.C. § 2-408(f)(1) (Proposed Draft July 1999), supra note 40.
43. See U.C.C. § 2-408(b)(2) (Proposed Draft July 1999), supra note 40.
44. Revised Section 2-814 provides in relevant part:
(a) An action for breach of a contract or other obligation under this article
must be commenced within the later of four years after the right of action has
accrued under subsection (b) or (c) or one year after the breach was or
should have been discovered, but no longer than five years after the right of
action accrued. The original agreement may not extend the period of limita-
tion but may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year. How-
ever, in a consumer contract, the period of limitation may not be reduced.
(c) If a breach of warranty is claimed, the definitions in Section 2-401 and
the following rules apply:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4), a right of action accrues
for breach of a warranty that arises under Section 2-403, 2-404, 2-405, or 2-
409 when a seller has tendered delivery of nonconforming goods to the im-
mediate buyer and has completed performance of any agreed installation or
assembly of the goods.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4), a right of action accrues
for a breach of an express warranty obligation arising under Section 2-408
when the remote buyer or remote lessee receives the new goods or goods
sold or leased as new goods.
(3) For a breach of the warranty arising under Section 2-402, a right of action
accrues when the aggrieved party discovers or should have discovered the
breach. However, an action for breach of the warranty of noninfringement
may not be commenced more than eight years after tender of delivery of the
goods to the aggrieved party.
(4) If the seller has made a representation about the performance or quality
of the goods which extends to the performance or quality of the goods after
delivery and that representation creates a warranty under Section 2-403 or a
warranty obligation under Section 2-408, a right of action accrues when the
immediate buyer under Section 2-403 or remote buyer or remote lessee
under Section 2-408(b) discovers or should have discovered that the goods
did not conform to that representation.
U.C.C. § 2-814 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
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In making this demarcation between privity and non-privity warranties,
the revision also had to address who besides the buyer could take advan-
tage of a warranty the seller made and the applicable remedies available
to those non-buyers. These issues of warranty extension are addressed in
current Section 2-31845 and are contained in new Sections 2-408 and Sec-
tion 2-409. Section 2-408 allows a limited extension beyond a remote
consumer buyer to the buyer's household or transferees in the situation
where a seller not in privity with that consumer buyer gives a warranty
packaged with the goods, 46 but allows no extension when a remote seller
makes a warranty by advertising.47 For personal injury damages, Section
2-40948 allows a warranty made to an immediate buyer to be extended to
either the buyer's household or alternatively to any person reasonably
45. Current Section 2-318 provides:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (1995).
46. See U.C.C. § 2-408(b)(2) (Proposed Draft July 1999), supra note 40.
47. See U.C.C. § 2-408(c) (Proposed Draft July 1999), supra note 40.
48. Revised Section 2-409 provides:
(a) In a consumer contract, a seller's express or implied warranty or a reme-
dial promise made to an immediate consumer buyer extends to any member
of the family or household or an invitee to the household of the immediate
consumer buyer or a transferee from the immediate consumer buyer who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and
who suffers damage other than injury to the person resulting from a breach
of warranty or a remedial promise. The seller may not disclaim, modify, or
limit damages arising under this section unless the seller has a substantial
interest in having a warranty or a remedial promise extend only to the imme-
diate consumer buyer.
Alternative A
(b) A seller's warranty, whether express or implied extends to any individual
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty in the family or household
of the immediate buyer or who is a guest in the immediate buyer's home if it
is reasonable for the seller to expect that the individual may use, consume, or
be affected by the goods. A seller may not disclaim or limit the operation of
this subsection.
Alternative B
(b) A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any individual
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not disclaim or limit the operation of this subsection.
End of Alternatives
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expected to be affected by the breach of warranty.49 In the case of non-
personal injury damages, a warranty to an immediate consumer buyer is
extended to the transferees from or the household of the consumer
buyer.50 In all cases of extension, the persons to whom the warranty is
extended cannot recover consequential damages for lost profits.5' This
recognition of modem warranty practice balances the imposition of liabil-
ity on sellers against a minimal extension of that liability beyond a con-
sumer buyer coupled with restrictions on the remedies available to the
persons to whom the warranty is extended. While these revisions codify
part of the current case law and restrict part of the warranty liability of
sellers under current law, the provisions are an intricate balance negoti-
ated among the observers and the drafting committee over the course of
1998 and 1999.
In the performance of a contract for sale of goods, both a buyer and
seller have certain responsibilities. The seller has an obligation to tender
conforming goods in a conforming manner, and the buyer has an obliga-
tion to accept conforming goods and pay for the goods in a conforming
manner.52 Conduct conforming to the contract requirements is the linch-
pin of Article 2's provisions on performance and breach. The July 1999
draft of Revised Article 2 continues that focus and has made several
changes to balance fairness and certainty in the performance and breach
provisions. Three notable examples are the provisions on waiver and no-
tice of breach, care of goods after a rejection or revocation, and cure of a
breach of contract.
The provisions on waiver and notice of breach provide that an ag-
grieved party who accepts a nonconforming performance should give no-
tice of a breach in order to preserve the ability to exercise all of the
(c) This article does not diminish the rights and remedies of any third-party
beneficiary or assignee under the law of contracts or of persons to which
goods are transferred by operation of law and does not displace any other
law that extends a warranty or remedial promise to or for the benefit of any
other person.
(d) The scope of any warranty extended under this section to other than the
immediate buyer and the remedies for breach may be limited by the enforce-
able terms of the contract between the seller and the immediate buyer. To
the extent not limited:
(1) the scope of the warranty is determined by Sections 2-402, 2-403, 2-404,
and 2-405; and
(2) the remedies for breach of warranty or a remedial promise for other than
the immediate buyer are determined by Section 2-408(0(2) and (3).
(e) A right of action for breach of warranty or breach of a remedial promise
under this section accrues as provided in Section 2-814(b)(3) and (c).
U.C.C. § 2-409 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
49. See id. § 2-409(b) (Alternatives A and B).
50. See U.C.C. § 2-409(a) (Proposed Draft July 1999), supra note 48.
51. See U.C.C. § 2-408(f)(3) (Proposed Draft July 1999), supra note 40; U.C.C. § 2-
409(d) (Proposed Draft July 1999), supra note 48.
52. Current Section 2-301 provides: "The obligation of the seller is to transfer and
deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract." U.C.C.
§ 2-301 (1995).
Revised Section 2-601 (July 1999 draft) provides: "The parties shall perform in accord-
ance with the contract." U.C.C. § 2-601 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
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remedies available to the aggrieved party. While the buyer has always
been required to give such a notice in the case of accepted goods in order
to pursue remedies for breach under current Article 2,53 the July 1999
draft of Revised Article 2 provides that failure to give notice does not bar
the ability to pursue remedies unless the seller is prejudiced and requires
that persons other than buyers to whom warranties have been extended
must give notice of the breach of warranty to the persons against whom
the breach is claimed.54 The July 1999 draft also changes the requirement
from current Article 2 that a buyer rejecting the goods give notice to the
seller of reasonably ascertainable nonconformities justifying the rejection
in order to obtain any remedies for breach.55 Instead, the failure to par-
ticularize the defects under the revision precludes only the ability to as-
sert a proper rejection. 56 The July 1999 draft also adds a new provision
that prevents an aggrieved party (either buyer or seller) from canceling a
53. Current Section 2-607 provides in relevant part: "(3) Where a tender has been
accepted (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy . . .
U.C.C. § 2-607 (1995).
54. Revised Section 2-707 provides in relevant part:
(c) If a tender of delivery has been accepted, the following rules apply:
(1) The buyer or a person entitled to enforce a warranty or warranty obliga-
tion shall notify the party claimed against of the breach of contract, warranty,
or warranty obligation within a reasonable time after the breach was discov-
ered or should have been discovered. However, a failure to give timely no-
tice bars the person required to notify the party claimed against from a
remedy only to the extent that the party entitled to notice establishes that it
was prejudiced by the failure.
U.C.C. § 2-707 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
55. Current Section 2-605 provides:
(1) The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular de-
fect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from rely-
ing on the unstated defect to justify rejection or to establish breach
(a) where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably; or
(b) between merchants when the seller has after rejection made a request in
writing for a full and final written statement of all defects on which the buyer
proposes to rely.
(2) Payment against documents made without reservation of rights precludes
recovery of the payment for defects apparent on the face of the documents.
U.C.C. § 2-605 (1995).
56. Revised Section 2-702 provides in relevant part:
(c) A party is precluded from relying on a nonconforming performance as
follows:
(1) Buyer's payment upon tender of a document of title to the buyer made
without reservation of rights waives the right to assert defects apparent on
the face of the document of title.
(2) The buyer's failure to state, in connection with a rejection under Section
2-703, a particular nonconformity that is ascertainable by reasonable inspec-
tion precludes reliance on the unstated nonconformity to justify rejection if:
(A) the seller, upon a seasonable particularization, had a right to cure under
Section 2-709 and could have cured the nonconformity; or
(B) between merchants, the seller after rejection made a request in a record
for a full and final statement of all nonconformities on which the buyer pro-
poses to rely.
(3) The buyer's failure to state, in connection with a revocation of accept-
ance under Section 2-708, a known nonconformity that justifies the revoca-
tion precludes the buyer from relying on that nonconformity to justify the
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contract if it fails to object when accepting a nonconforming perform-
ance. The aggrieved party's other remedies are preserved without the
need to object unless the breaching party is prejudiced by the failure to
object.57 These notice and waiver provisions balance the breaching
party's right to know what has gone wrong in the transaction against the
fairness of not punishing the aggrieved party for failure to give notice
unless the breaching party is harmed by that failure.
Another example of a balance between fairness and certainty is in the
provision on the buyer's care of goods after a rejection or a revocation of
acceptance. Assume a buyer rejects the goods or revokes acceptance of
the goods but uses the goods after notifying the seller of the rejection or
revocation. Courts have struggled with whether to treat that use as an
acceptance of the goods that moots the rejection or revocation or as a use
that violates the buyer's obligation to take reasonable care of rejected
goods.58 Often the buyer has no choice but to use the goods even if re-
jected, such as in the case of a defective mobile home where the buyer
cannot afford replacement housing and the seller refuses or is unable to
take the goods back and refund the price. 59 If the court finds that the use
is not an acceptance, the court may require the buyer to pay to the seller
the reasonable value of the use.60 The July 1999 draft adopts that ap-
proach in an attempt to balance the rights of the seller to the rejected
goods and the rights of the buyer to reject goods and get a refund of the
price.61 This revision also balances the certainty of the acceptance and
revocation if the seller had a right to cure under Section 2-709 and could
have cured that nonconformity.
U.C.C. § 2-702 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
57. Revised Section 2-702 provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and Section 2-707(c)(1), if
a party knows the other party's performance constitutes a breach of contract
but accepts that performance, the following rules apply:
(1) The nonbreaching party that accepted performance is precluded from re-
lying on the breach to cancel the contract if it fails within a reasonable time
to object to the breach.
(2) The nonbreaching party's acceptance of the performance and failure to
object does not preclude a claim for damages unless the party in breach has
reasonably and in good faith changed its position in reliance on the non-
breaching party's inaction.
(b) A party's failure to object under subsection (a) to a nonconforming per-
formance does not preclude its objection to the same or similar breach of the
contract in future performances of like kind unless the nonbreaching party
expressly so states. A statement waiving future performance may be re-
tracted by seasonable notice received by the other party stating that strict
performance will be required unless retraction would be unjust in view of a
material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-702 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
58. See e.g., Wilk Paving, Inc. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc., 649 A.2d 778, 27 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 130 (Vt. 1994); Liarikes v. Melloy, 639 N.E.2d 716, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
136 (Mass. 1994).
59. See Carolyn F. Lazaris, Note, Article 2: Revocation of Acceptance - Should a Seller
be Granted a Setoff for the Buyer's Use of the Goods?, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1073, 1081-82
(1996).
60. See id.
61. Revised Section 2-704 provides:
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rejection line with fairness to the buyer who is justified in the rejection or
revocation of acceptance and faced with the seller's recalcitrance.
A third example of balance in the performance and breach area is the
revised provision on the seller's cure of the breach.62 This section has
been substantially rewritten to allow the seller to cure after revocation of
acceptance on the grounds of a latent defect, in addition to cure after
rejection of the goods. The new cure provision also provides a more flex-
(a) Subject to Sections 2-705 and 2-829(b), after an effective rejection or jus-
tifiable revocation of acceptance, a buyer in physical possession of the goods
shall hold the goods with reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a suffi-
cient time to permit the seller to remove them. The buyer has no further
obligation with regard to goods rightfully rejected or to which an acceptance
has been justifiably revoked.
(b) If a buyer uses the goods after an effective rejection or justifiable revoca-
tion of acceptance, the following rules apply:
(1) Any use by the buyer which is unreasonable under the circumstances and
which is either inconsistent with the seller's ownership or inconsistent with
the buyer's claim of rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance is an
acceptance only if ratified by the seller.
(2) If the buyer wrongfully rejected the goods, any use of the goods by the
buyer which is inconsistent with the seller's ownership or inconsistent with
the buyer's claim of rejection is unreasonable.
(3) If use of the goods is reasonable under the circumstances, the use is not
an acceptance, but the buyer, upon returning or disposing of the goods, shall
pay the seller the value of the reasonable use to the buyer, unless requiring
the buyer to do so would be unjust under the circumstances. The use value
must be deducted from the amount paid to be refunded to the buyer, if any,
and from any damages to which the buyer is otherwise entitled under this
article.
U.C.C. § 2-704 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
62. Revised Section 2-709 provides:
(a) If the buyer rightfully and effectively rejects goods or a tender of delivery
under Section 2-703 or justifiably revokes an acceptance under Section 2-
708(a)(2) and the agreed time for performance has not expired, the seller,
upon seasonable notice to the buyer and at its own expense, may cure the
breach of contract by making a conforming tender of delivery within the
agreed time. The seller shall compensate the buyer for all of the buyer's
reasonable and necessary expenses caused by the nonconforming tender and
subsequent cure.
(b) If the buyer rightfully and effectively rejects goods or a tender of deliv-
ery under Section 2-703 or justifiably revokes an acceptance under Section 2-
708(a)(2) and the agreed time for performance has expired, the seller, upon
seasonable notice to the buyer and at its own expense, may cure the breach
of contract, if the cure is appropriate and timely under the circumstances, by
making a tender of conforming goods. The seller shall compensate the buyer
for all of the buyer's reasonable and necessary expenses caused by the non-
conforming tender and subsequent cure.
U.C.C. § 2-709 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Current Section 2-508 provides:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-con-
forming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may
seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the
contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money
allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further
reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
U.C.C. § 2-508 (1995).
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ible test for cure after the time for performance has expired. In exchange
for giving the seller more flexibility, the cure has to be of a conforming
tender or conforming goods and the seller has a statutory obligation to
pay the expenses the buyer has incurred due to the seller's nonconform-
ing performance and cure. The expanded right to cure for sellers is bal-
anced against explicit provisions to protect the buyer from the
consequences of the seller's breach and subsequent cure.
The remedies provisions of the July 1999 draft of Revised Article 2 are
also the result of an attempt to balance the buyer's and seller's remedies
in order to allow each, as an aggrieved party, to achieve its expectancy
interest in the event of a breach. To that end, the remedies part of the
revision starts out with several principles, such as a statement of the ex-
pectation interest, a provision on mitigation of harm, a prohibition on
double recovery, and a recognition of restitution- or reliance-based re-
covery in an appropriate case.63 The buyer's and seller's provisions on
using market price as a measurement for recovery of damages are compa-
rable to each other. Each provision also addresses the measurement of
market price in the anticipatory repudiation context, a subject that has
often been litigated, and provides that market price will be measured at
the end of a commercially reasonable time after the aggrieved party
learns of the repudiation. 64 The innovative remedies from current Article
63. Revised Section 2-803 provides:
(a) In accordance with Section 1-106, the remedies provided in this article
must be liberally administered with the purpose of placing the aggrieved
party in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.
(b) Unless the contract provides for liquidated damages enforceable under
Section 2-809 or a limited remedy enforceable under Section 2-810, an ag-
grieved party may not recover that part of a loss resulting from a breach of
contract that could have been avoided by reasonable measures under the
circumstances. The burden of establishing that reasonable measures under
the circumstances were not taken is on the party in breach.
(c) The rights granted by and remedies available under this article are cumu-
lative, but a party may not recover more than once for the same injury.
(d) This article does not impair a remedy for breach of an obligation or
promise collateral or ancillary to a contract for sale.
U.C.C. § 2-803 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-804 provides:
Subject to Section 2-803, if a breach of contract occurs, the aggrieved party
may recover compensation for the loss resulting in the ordinary course from
the breach as determined under Sections 2-815 through 2-829 or as deter-
mined in any other reasonable manner, together with incidental damages and
consequential damages, less expenses saved as a result of the breach.
U.C.C. § 2-804 (Proposed Draft July 1999). Comment 2 to Section 2-804 explains that
"[allthough compensation of the expectancy interest of the aggrieved party is the general
rule, a party may also use this measurement to compensate the aggrieved party's reliance
or restitution interests." U.C.C. § 2-804 cmt. 2 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
64. Revised Section 2-821 provides:
(a) If the buyer is in breach of contract, the seller may recover damages
based upon the contract price less the market price of comparable goods,
together with any incidental and consequential damages, less expenses saved
as a result of the breach, as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), the market price of com-
parable goods is determined at the time and place for tender of delivery.
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2 based on the cover price and resale price remain intact.65 In addition,
the buyer and seller each have provisions allowing recovery of the goods
(2) In the case of a repudiation governed by Section 2-712, the market price
of comparable goods is determined at the place for tender of delivery and at
the expiration of a commercially reasonable period after the seller learned of
the repudiation, but no later than the time stated in paragraph (1). The pe-
riod includes a commercially reasonable period for awaiting performance
under Section 2-712 and any further commercially reasonable period for ob-
taining any substitute performance.
(b) If the measure of damages under subsection (a) or Section 2-819 is inad-
equate to put the seller in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed, the seller may recover, together with incidental and consequent-
ial damages:
(1) lost profits, including reasonable overhead, resulting from the breach of
contract determined in any reasonable manner; and
(2) reasonable expenditures made in preparing for or performing the
contract.
U.C.C. § 2-821 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-826 provides:
(a) If the seller is in breach of contract, the buyer may recover damages
based upon the market price of comparable goods, less the contract price,
together with any incidental and consequential damages, less expenses saved
as a result of the breach, as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), the market price for com-
parable goods is determined at the time for tender of delivery or when the
buyer learned that the tender of delivery did not occur, whichever is later.
(2) In the case of a repudiation governed by Section 2-712, the market price
of comparable goods is determined at the expiration of a commercially rea-
sonable period after the buyer learned of the repudiation, but no later than
the time stated in paragraph (1). The period includes the commercially rea-
sonable time for awaiting performance under Section 2-712 and any further
commercially reasonable period for obtaining substitute performance.
(b) Market price is determined at the place for tender of delivery. However,
in a case of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, market price is
determined at the place of arrival.
U.C.C. § 2-826 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
65. Revised Section 2-819 provides:
(a) If the buyer is in breach of contract, the seller may resell the goods con-
cerned that are in the seller's possession or control. If the resale is made in
good faith, within a commercially reasonable time, and in a commercially
reasonable manner, the seller may recover the contract price less the resale
price together with any consequential and incidental damages, less expenses
saved as a result of the breach.
(b) A resale:
(1) may be at a public auction or at a private sale, including a private auc-
tion, a sale by one or more contracts to sell, or an identification to an existing
contract of the seller;
(2) may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any
terms, but every aspect of the sale, including the method, manner, time,
place, and terms, must be commercially reasonable; and
(3) must be reasonably identified as referring to the breached contract, but
the goods need not be in existence or have been identified to the contract
before the breach.
(c) If a resale is at a public auction, the following rules apply:
(1) Only identified goods may be sold unless there is a recognized market
for the public sale of futures in goods of the kind.
(2) The resale must be made at a usual place or market for public sale if one
is reasonably available. Except in the case of goods that are perishable or
threaten to decline in value speedily, the seller shall give the buyer reason-
able notice of the time and place of the resale.
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from the other party and dealing with the respective rights of other claim-
ants to the goods. 66 The prepaying buyer's right to obtain the goods from
the seller was broadened to eliminate the requirement that the seller be
(3) If the goods are not to be within the view of persons attending the sale,
the notice of sale must state the place where the goods are located and pro-
vide for their reasonable inspection by prospective bidders.
(4) The seller may buy the goods.
(d) A good-faith purchaser at a resale takes the goods free of any rights of
the original buyer, even if the seller fails to comply with this section.
(e) The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on a resale.
However, a person in the position of a seller or a buyer which has rightfully
rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance shall account for any excess over
the amount of the claim secured by the security interest provided in Section
2-829(b).
(f) A seller that does not resell in the manner required under this section is
not barred from any other remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-819 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-825 provides:
(a) If the seller is in breach of contract, the buyer may cover by making in
good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of, con-
tract to purchase, or arrangement to procure comparable goods to substitute
for those due from the seller.
(b) A buyer that covers in the manner required by subsection (a) may re-
cover damages measured by the cost of covering less the contract price, to-
gether with any incidental or consequential damages, less expenses saved as a
result of the seller's breach of contract.
(c) A buyer that does not cover in a manner required under subsection (a) is
not barred from any other remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-825 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
66. Revised Section 2-816 provides:
(a) If the buyer is in breach of contract under Section 2-701, the seller may
withhold delivery of the goods that are the subject of the breached contract.
In an installment contract, if the breach is of the whole contract under Sec-
tion 2-710(c), the seller may withhold delivery of any undelivered balance.
(b) The seller may reclaim goods delivered to the buyer under a contract for
sale only in the following circumstances:
(1) A seller that discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent may reclaim the goods upon a demand made within a reasonable
time after the buyer's receipt of the goods.
(2) If payment is due and demanded on delivery to the buyer, the seller may
reclaim the goods delivered upon a demand made within a reasonable time
after the seller discovers or should have discovered that payment was not
made.
(c) Reclamation under subsection (b) is subject to the rights under this arti-
cle of a buyer in ordinary course of business or other good-faith purchaser
for value that vest before the seller takes possession under a timely demand
for reclamation. Successful reclamation of the goods under subsection (b)(1)
precludes all other remedies with respect to them.
U.C.C. § 2-816 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-824 provides:
(a) A buyer that pays all or a part of the price of goods identified to the
contract, whether or not they have been shipped, and makes and keeps open
a tender of full performance has a right to recover the goods from the seller if
the seller repudiates or does not deliver as required by the contract.
(b) The buyer may recover from the seller by [replevin, detinue, sequestra-
tion, claims and delivery, or the like] goods identified to a contract if:
(1) after reasonable efforts, the buyer is unable to effect cover for the goods
or the circumstances reasonably indicate that an effort to obtain cover would
be unavailing and the buyer tenders full performance of its obligation under
the contract; or
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insolvent within ten days of the buyer's payment. The seller's right to
reclaim in a cash sale was codified, and the right to reclaim on account of
the buyer's insolvency was broadened. The revision also strengthens the
role of agreements about remedies, such as liquidated damages and lim-
ited remedies. 67 In commercial sales, a liquidated damages clause would
be enforceable without regard to the inconvenience or nonfeasability of
(2) the goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the
security interest in them has been made or tendered.
(c) A buyer's right vests under subsection (a) or (b) upon identification of
the goods to the contract for sale even if the seller has not then repudiated
the contract or failed to deliver as required by the contract.
Legislative Note: States should insert the appropriate name for their civil ac-
tion for replevin, claim and delivery, detinue, sequestration or the like in sub-
section (b).
U.C.C. § 2-824 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-505 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the rights of creditors of
the seller with respect to goods identified to a contract for sale and in the
seller's possession are subject to the buyer's rights under Sections 2-807, 2-
822, and 2-824, if the buyer's rights vest before a creditor's claim in rem at-
taches to the goods.
(b) A creditor of a seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a
contract for sale as void if, as against the creditor, a retention of possession
or identification by the seller is fraudulent under any law of the State in
which the goods are situated. However, the retention of possession in good
faith and current course of trade by a merchant seller for a commercially
reasonable time after a sale or identification is not fraudulent.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a) and Section 2-504(c), this
article does not impair rights of creditors of the seller:
(1) under Article 9; or
(2) if identification to the contract or delivery is not made in current course
of trade but is made in satisfaction of or as security for a preexisting claim for
money, security, or the like under circumstances that under any law of the
State in which the goods are situated, apart from this article, would constitute
a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference.
U.C.C. § 2-505 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
67. Revised Section 2-809 provides:
(a) Damages for breach of contract by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the diffi-
culties of proof of loss in the event of breach, either the actual loss caused by
the breach or the loss anticipated at the time of the agreement that would be
caused by the breach, and in a consumer contract, the inconvenience or
nonfeasability of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. If a term liqui-
dating damages is unenforceable under this subsection, the aggrieved party
may pursue the remedies provided in this article. Section 2-810 determines
the enforceability of a term that limits but does not liquidate damages.
(b) If a seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods or stops performance
because of the buyer's breach of contract or insolvency, the buyer is entitled
to restitution for any amount by which the sum of payments exceeds the
amount to which the seller is entitled under a term liquidating damages in
accordance with subsection (a).
(c) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (b) is subject to setoff to
the extent that the seller establishes a right to recover damages under the
provisions of this article other than subsection (a) and to the extent of the
amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer directly or indirectly
by reason of the contract.
(d) If the seller has received payment in goods, their reasonable value or the
proceeds of their resale are payments for the purposes of subsection (b).
However, if the seller has notice of the buyer's breach before reselling goods
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obtaining an adequate remedy. In a commercial sale, if a limited remedy
failed of its essential purposes, the companion clause excluding liability
for consequential damages would still be enforceable. Finally, the
changes to the statute of limitations are designed to increase certainty
about when a cause of action accrues in various situations under Article
2, while allowing an aggrieved party adequate time for bringing a cause of
action.68 To that end, the July 1999 draft sets forth several different ac-
crual rules for the particular types of causes of action.
received in part performance, the resale is subject to the requirements of
Section 2-819.
U.C.C. § 2-809 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
Revised Section 2-810 provides:
(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c) and Section 2-809, the following rules
apply:
(1) An agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution
for those provided in this article and may limit or alter the measure of dam-
ages recoverable under this article, such as by limiting the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replace-
ment of nonconforming goods or parts.
(2) Resort to an agreed remedy under paragraph (1) is optional. However,
if the parties expressly agree that the agreed remedy is exclusive, it is the sole
remedy.
(3) An agreed remedy under this section may create a remedial promise.
(b) If circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essen-
tial purpose, the following rules apply:(1) In a contract other than a consumer contract, the aggrieved party may
pursue all remedies available under this article. However, an agreement ex-
pressly providing that consequential damages are excluded, including those
resulting from the failure to provide the exclusive or limited remedy, is en-
forceable to the extent permitted under subsection (c).
(2) In a consumer contract, the aggrieved party may reject the goods or re-
voke acceptance and may pursue all remedies available under this article in-
cluding the right to recover consequential damages, despite any term
purporting to exclude or limit consequential damages.
(c) Subject to subsection (b), consequential damages may be limited or ex-
cluded by agreement unless the operation of the limitation or exclusion is
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the per-
son in the case of a consumer contract is prima facie unconscionable, but
limitation of damages for a commercial loss is not.
U.C.C. § 2-810 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
68. Revised Section 2-814 provides:
(a) An action for breach of a contract or other obligation under this article
must be commenced within the later of four years after the right of action has
accrued under subsection (b) or (c) or one year after the breach was or
should have been discovered, but no longer than five years after the right of
action accrued. The original agreement may not extend the period of limita-
tion but may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year. How-
ever, in a consumer contract, the period of limitation may not be reduced.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the follow rules apply:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a right of action accrues
for breach of contract when the breach occurs, even if the aggrieved party
did not have knowledge of the breach.
(2) For breach of a contract by repudiation under Section 2-712, a right of
action accrues at the earlier of when the aggrieved party elects to treat the
repudiation as a breach or when a commercially reasonable time for awaiting
performance has expired.
(3) For breach of a remedial promise, a right of action accrues when the
remedial promise is not performed when due.
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Although this brief sketch of the changes to Article 2 is not exhaustive,
the examples cited above demonstrate that this revision has not tried to
change Article 2 from its current orientation and has not favored any one
side in the process. Rather, the changes are targeted and incremental,
rather than dramatic and sweeping. Fans of current Article 2 would have
had no trouble adjusting to the revised article.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE REVISION OF
ARTICLE 2
A. LAW REVISION IS MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT LOOKS FROM THE
OUTSIDE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, DEMOCRACY IS MESSY
Participants in the revision process had drastically different ideas about
the legal rules that should guide the transaction based upon their own
anecdotal sense of whether the rule created problems in transactions.
Some participants' quest for rules that provided certainty necessarily un-
dermined the flexibility provided by statements of standards used to
(4) In an action by a buyer against a person that is answerable over to the
buyer for a claim asserted against the buyer, the buyer's right of action
against the person answerable over accrues at the time the claim was origi-
nally asserted against the buyer.
(c) If a breach of warranty is claimed, the definitions in Section 2-401 and
the following rules apply:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4), a right of action accrues
for breach of a warranty that arises under Section 2-403, 2-404, 2-405, or 2-
409 when a seller has tendered delivery of nonconforming goods to the im-
mediate buyer and has completed performance of any agreed installation or
assembly of the goods.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4), a right of action accrues
for a breach of an express warranty obligation arising under Section 2-408
when the remote buyer or remote lessee receives the new goods or goods
sold or leased as new goods.
(3) For a breach of the warranty arising under Section 2-402, a right of action
accrues when the aggrieved party discovers or should have discovered the
breach. However, an action for breach of the warranty of noninfringement
may not be commenced more than eight years after tender of delivery of the
goods to the aggrieved party.
(4) If the seller has made a representation about the performance or quality
of the goods which extends to the performance or quality of the goods after
delivery and that representation creates a warranty under Section 2-403 or a
warranty obligation under Section 2-408, a right of action accrues when the
immediate buyer under Section 2-403 or remote buyer or remote lessee
under Section 2-408(b) discovers or should have discovered that the goods
did not conform to that representation.
(d) If an action for breach of contract or other obligation commenced within
the applicable period of limitation is terminated but a remedy by another
action for the same breach is available, the other action may be commenced
after the expiration of the period of limitation and within six months after
the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from volun-
tary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(e) This section does not alter the law on tolling of a statute of limitations
and does not apply to a right of action that accrued before the effective date
of this article.
U.C.C. § 2-814 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
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guide behavior as favored by other participants.6 9 The push to resolve
litigated questions was resisted by those who desired to leave the statute
untouched with its resulting ambiguity. The search for common ground
lead to decisions about what to codify and what to leave to comments.
The result of those countervailing forces is a revision draft that reflects an
incremental change in a few areas from current Article 2, while leaving in
place the basic structure and philosophy. Critics may say that the revision
did not accomplish very much, as there are no sweeping changes. There
are at least two responses to that critique. First, the current Article 2
works fairly well and sweeping changes are not needed. The revision
draft's incremental changes help to resolve identified trouble spots but no
more is necessary. Second, if sweeping changes were needed, 70 they were
not possible given the competing forces in the revision process and the
drafting committee's desire to maintain the current balance between buy-
ers and sellers in the draft. Perhaps the real lesson learned in this process
is to not start a revision project until a large constituency agrees reform is
needed and to have a tighter blueprint for the types of changes that
should be considered. While the Article 2 revision process had a partial
blueprint in the guise of the PEB Study report, the venture into the "hub
and spoke" process early on allowed for forays into a less structured pro-
cess for change.
B. BEAUTY (OR PROGRESS) IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER
One of the interesting phenomena of a revision process is to witness
agreement that an issue should be resolved and then watch the discussion
unfold as to how that issue should be resolved. Invariably, participants
differed on how the issue should be resolved depending on whether the
advocates identified more with the buyer's perspective or the seller's per-
spective, or with an industry perspective, as opposed to a consumer per-
spective. For example, an issue often litigated is the effect of the
exclusion of consequential changes when an agreed, exclusive, limited
remedy fails to be provided. The typical transaction is that the seller
promises to repair or replace a defective good and excludes liability for
any consequential damages in the event the good is defective. The seller
is unable to repair or replace the defective good and the buyer suffers
consequential damages due to the failure of the good. At the heart of the
issue is the intent of the parties as to the relationship between the conse-
quential damage excluder and the agreement to provide the limited rem-
edy. Did the parties intend to allocate the risk of consequential harm to
the buyer even if the seller was unable to remedy the defective good in a
69. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1685 (1976).
70. In fact, some sweeping changes were suggested but defeated after considerable
discussion and disagreement. Two examples are a proposal to eliminate the statute of
frauds and a proposal to eliminate consequential damages as a default rule.
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timely manner? Here the courts split, some saying yes, some saying no.71
The revision follows the courts' general approach in the majority of cases.
In the commercial case, the presumed intent is that the two clauses oper-
ate independently so that if the limited remedy is not provided, the conse-
quential damage excluder is effective. In the consumer case, the
presumption is just the opposite, if the limited remedy fails, the conse-
quential damage excluder fails as well.72 Industry advocates argued for
the commercial presumption in all cases, including consumer cases,
clearly wearing only their seller hats, in spite of the numerous commercial
cases where commercial buyers had argued for the result as provided in
the consumer cases and succeeded. Industry representatives have contin-
uously opposed the relief accorded consumer buyers under this provision.
This is a clear example where advocates identified only with the seller's
side of the equation, ignoring the buyer's considerations. If one looks at
the revision from a seller's perspective, the rule for commercial cases is a
victory and the rule in consumer cases is a defeat. If one looks at it from
71. See e.g., Middletown Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 802 F. Supp.
1135,20 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 815 (D. Del. 1992); International Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Franz, 534
N.W.2d 261, 26 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1137 (Minn. 1995); Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere
Indus. Equip. Co., 455 S.E.2d 183, 28 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 190 (S.C. App. 1995); Howard
Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to an Exclusion of Conse-
quential Damages: An Objective Approach, 25 DuQ. L. REv. 551 (1987); Henry Mather,
Consequential Damages When Exclusive Repair Remedies Fail: Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-719, 38 S. C. L. REv. 673 (1987); Daniel C. Hagen, Note, Sections 2-719(2) & 2-
719(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Limited Warranty Package & Consequential
Damages, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 111 (1996).
72. Revised Section 2-810 provides:
(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c) and Section 2-809, the following rules
apply:
(1) An agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution
for those provided in this article and may limit or alter the measure of dam-
ages recoverable under this article, such as by limiting the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replace-
ment of nonconforming goods or parts.
(2) Resort to an agreed remedy under paragraph (1) is optional. However,
if the parties expressly agree that the agreed remedy is exclusive, it is the sole
remedy.
(3) An agreed remedy under this section may create a remedial promise.
(b) If circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essen-
tial purpose, the following rules apply:
(1) In a contract other than a consumer contract, the aggrieved party may
pursue all remedies available under this article. However, an agreement ex-
pressly providing that consequential damages are excluded, including those
resulting from the failure to provide the exclusive or limited remedy, is en-
forceable to the extent permitted under subsection (c).
(2) In a consumer contract, the aggrieved party may reject the goods or re-
voke acceptance and may pursue all remedies available under this article in-
cluding the right to recover consequential damages, despite any term
purporting to exclude or limit consequential damages.
(c) Subject to subsection (b), consequential damages may be limited or ex-
cluded by agreement unless the operation of the limitation or exclusion is
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the per-
son in the case of a consumer contract is prima facie unconscionable, but
limitation of damages for a commercial loss is not.
U.C.C. § 2-810 (Proposed Draft July 1999).
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a buyer's perspective, the commercial rule is a defeat and the consumer
rule is a victory. Whether the revision rule is a positive or negative result
depends upon the observer's perspective as either a buyer or a seller.
From a law reform perspective, however, the certainty provided by a
clear rule that resolves a much litigated issue in a manner consistent with
the courts' approach and the typical expectations of the parties in a trans-
action would be the real victory.
C. HARMONY is DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE WHEN DIFFERENT SINGERS
ARE ALL IN DIFFERENT ROOMS AT DIFFERENT TIMES
One of the difficulties with the revision process was the need to coordi-
nate four different committees with (2, 2A, UCITA, and UETA) at least
four different perspectives on various issues. Once the "hub and spoke"
idea was scuttled as unworkable, an equally unworkable process of har-
monization was put into place. The first question was always whether
there was any reason for the rule to be different in the different drafts.
Each drafting committee had its own reporter and was comprised of be-
tween 10-20 people, all of whom had ideas about the proper rule and the
way to state the rule, even if all agreed as to what the rule should be. In
numerous coordination meetings of the chairs and reporters for the vari-
ous committees, the identification of rules to be harmonized, the content
of those rules, and the drafting of those rules was debated. Needless to
say, those meetings were excruciating.
In my opinion, the harmonization process was a back door attempt at a
"hub and spoke" product but in a way that made it impossible to truly
harmonize. Without involving the drafting committees in the harmoniza-
tion process, the reporters and chairs had to make a judgment about
whether the differences in the various drafts were stylistic or substantive.
On matters of substance, the reporters could only take suggestions back
to their respective committees for deliberation. Even if agreed to by the
reporter or the committees, the continuing problem of harmonizing drafts
that were constantly in flux due to the hectic pace of drafting committee
meetings, where items were discussed and voted on, meant that all of the
projects were continually out of step with each other. In reading the
drafts as they existed in July 1999, it is amazing that the drafts were any-
where close to each other on provisions that should be harmonized.
D. COMPROMISE is NOT A DIRTY WORD, BUT No GOOD DEED
GOES UNPUNISHED
In the NCCUSL process, one often hears about the need for compro-
mise in order to achieve an enactable product. In fact, compromise is
essential in a democratic system of government. The difficulty of the NC-
CUSL process, however, is that it does not necessarily create an atmos-
phere where parties have an incentive to compromise. The concern
about uniform enactability of the revision of Article 2 has created just the
opposite incentive. Groups that have compromised and agreed to less
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than what they wanted, and to changes in the law that are unfavorable to
them, such as the consumer groups, do not appear to have enough power
to get the act approved by NCCUSL. Groups that have not compromised
and can afford to whip up a frenzy of form letters from various organiza-
tions opposing the revision have succeeded in getting the project deferred
from two final readings, one in 1997 and one in 1999, because of the Con-
ference leadership's concerns about uniform enactability of the product.
The big question for NCCUSL in this project or any other project is the
relative importance of enactability in a uniform manner as balanced
against the substantive content of a draft. One of the ways that NCCUSL
has built respect for its products when taking those products to the states
for uniform enactment is the ability to argue that knowledgeable people
have considered the issues and arrived at a decision on the policy issues in
the draft in a balanced manner that considered all sides of an issue in an
open process. Is NCCUSL maintaining an independent judgment about
good policy so that an act approved by NCCUSL deserves uniform enact-
ment in the states? Alternatively, is NCCUSL relatively unconcerned
about the merits of the arguments on policy grounds and swayed by the
rhetoric of the lobbyists' positions who threaten to stop enactment unless
the act is to their liking? Conference leadership, upset by the volume of
mail received on revised Article 2 regardless of the merits of the argu-
ments, is a prime target for the persuasive effect of lobbyists' rhetoric.
The greater the concern about enactability, regardless of the merits of the
arguments, the less likely that NCCUSL functions as an independent
body that deserves respect for its acts as representing statements of good
policy made independent of lobbyists' positions. This is not a novel ob-
servation, but is certainly one that is borne out in the revision of Article 2
so far.
NCCUSL needs to examine its method of doing business. Uniform
enactability results when the act represents a balanced product forged in
a process of consensus. If the process is not conducted in a manner that
forges that consensus, but rather gives power to lobbying groups to have
it their way, pursuit of the enactability goal runs roughshod over the rea-
son why enactability is desirable-that the act represents good balanced
policy. If NCCUSL loses its focus on balanced policy, the respect that
NCCUSL has garnered for its products over the years will erode. That
would be a tragedy. Whether that will ultimately be the result of the
Article 2 and 2A revision process remains to be seen.
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